

**From:** Mark Mitchell <markm@utah.gov>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, June 3, 2020 7:37 AM  
**To:** Pam Tueller  
**Cc:** Justin Lee; Sherrie Swensen; Lannie Chapman  
**Subject:** Re: Notice of NVRA Violation

I have removed the history record.

Thanks, Pam!

**Mark B. Mitchell**

Director of Elections Systems  
Office of the Lieutenant Governor  
State of Utah

[markm@utah.gov](mailto:markm@utah.gov)  
(801) 538-9581

On Wed, Jun 3, 2020 at 7:14 AM Pam Tueller <[PTueller@slco.org](mailto:PTueller@slco.org)> wrote:

Mark,

I get the message that I cannot delete history from another County. Since he is State Holding looks like your team will have to delete this history.

Pam

**From:** Mark Mitchell <[markm@utah.gov](mailto:markm@utah.gov)>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, June 3, 2020 7:09 AM  
**To:** Pam Tueller <[PTueller@slco.org](mailto:PTueller@slco.org)>  
**Cc:** Justin Lee <[justinlee@utah.gov](mailto:justinlee@utah.gov)>; Sherrie Swensen <[sswensen@slco.org](mailto:sswensen@slco.org)>; Lannie Chapman <[LKChapman@slco.org](mailto:LKChapman@slco.org)>  
**Subject:** Re: Notice of NVRA Violation

Pam,

[markm@utah.gov](mailto:markm@utah.gov)  
(801) 538-9581

On Fri, May 29, 2020 at 11:25 AM Pam Tueller <[PTueller@slco.org](mailto:PTueller@slco.org)> wrote:

Mark,

I am doing some research on a voter that filed a claim against us that was forwarded to us by Justin Lee. In looking he has received voting credit for this June Primary election and he is not even a registered voter, he is in state holding. How could this happen? Please see below.

Individual Voting History							
Voter [REDACTED]		Voter ID [REDACTED]					
Election Name	Date	County	Precinct	Location	Type	Voted	Book:Line
Primary	06/30/2020	State Elections	UNKN		Normal	05/21/2020	0:0
General Election	11/02/2004	Salt Lake					0:0
Municipal Election	11/04/2003	Salt Lake					0:0
2003 FEB JORDGRAN SCHOOL BO	02/04/2003	Salt Lake					0:0
General Election	11/05/2002	Salt Lake					0:0
General Election	11/07/2000	Salt Lake					0:0
General Election	11/03/1998	Salt Lake					0:0
Primary Election	06/23/1998	Salt Lake					0:0
General Election	11/05/1996	Salt Lake					0:0
Primary Election	06/25/1996	Salt Lake					0:0

Thank you,



**Pam Tueller**

Election Director

Salt Lake County Clerk

[ptueller@slco.org](mailto:ptueller@slco.org)

801.538.1129

[justinlee@utah.gov](mailto:justinlee@utah.gov)

----- Forwarded message -----

From: Michael Teter <[REDACTED]>  
Date: Wed, May 27, 2020 at 2:12 PM  
Subject: Notice of NVRA Violation  
To: [justinlee@utah.gov](mailto:justinlee@utah.gov) <[justinlee@utah.gov](mailto:justinlee@utah.gov)>  
Cc: Chloe Lehman [REDACTED]

Dear Mr. Lee,

Please see the attached letter regarding [REDACTED].

Sincerely,

Michael Teter

Michael J. Teter

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



This message contains confidential information. If you are not the intended recipient, please delete this message and notify Michael Teter of Teter & Vu.

-----  
Justin Lee  
Director of Elections  
Office of the Lieutenant Governor  
State of Utah  
801.538.1129  
[justinlee@utah.gov](mailto:justinlee@utah.gov)

On Thu, Feb 27, 2020 at 4:22 PM Curtis Koch <[ckoch@co.davis.ut.us](mailto:ckoch@co.davis.ut.us)> wrote:

As promised, here is the follow-up to the discussion this morning. UAC voted to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

We'll keep the group in the loop as the language is released.

Thanks,

Curtis Koch  
Davis County Clerk/Auditor  
o: (801) 451-3491  
[REDACTED]



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From: Justin Lee on behalf of Justin Lee <justinlee@utah.gov>  
To: Sherrie Swensen  
Cc: Lannie Chapman  
Subject: Fwd: Assisted living residents  
Date: Monday, November 2, 2020 12:13:14 PM

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I don't know if you've heard from these individuals, but since they are in Salt Lake I figured I would forward it to you.

Thanks,

-----  
Justin Lee  
Director of Elections  
Office of the Lieutenant Governor  
State of Utah  
[justinlee@utah.gov](mailto:justinlee@utah.gov)

----- Forwarded message -----

From: Leo Lucey <[llucey@agutah.gov](mailto:llucey@agutah.gov)>  
Date: Mon, Nov 2, 2020 at 12:11 PM  
Subject: Fwd: Assisted living residents  
To: [REDACTED] <[justinlee@utah.gov](mailto:justinlee@utah.gov)>

Justine this looks like something for you or other election officials. Let me know if you need anything from us. Thanks

Get [Outlook for iOS](#)

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From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Monday, November 2, 2020 11:25:39 AM  
To: Leo Lucey <[llucey@agutah.gov](mailto:llucey@agutah.gov)>  
Subject: Assisted living residents

I'm very concerned that people who live in assisted living facilities will not be able to vote because of Covid-19. Covid-19 has made it almost impossible for any visitors to enter which I can understand that but when residents are telling me who are mentally competent that they're not getting ballots and they do not know where to go or who to call to vote it really concerns me! I hope we can get to the bottom of this, my friend's name is [REDACTED] her phone number is [REDACTED] if she does not answer and you need to call me for anything my number is [REDACTED]. The director at Legacy in south Jordan Utah assisted living is [REDACTED] you can call the Director and make sure that they're doing everything they can to make sure everyone who wants to can vote!

Thank you,

[REDACTED]



## Sherrie Swensen

Salt Lake County Clerk

Rashelle Hobbs

Chief Deputy Clerk

August 23, 2017

Lt. Governor Spencer J. Cox  
State of Utah  
350 State Street, Suite 220  
Salt Lake City, UT 84103

Dear Lieutenant Governor Cox;

I am writing in response to State Auditor Dougall's letter of August 17, 2017, wherein he outlined the observations and recommendations of his office after visiting three counties and observing their election processes. Auditor Dougall wrote that one of the counties reviewed provides a "security sleeve" in which to enclose the mail-in ballot. He noted: "This sleeve appeared to provide greater secrecy when enclosed within the return envelope; *however, once removed from the return envelope, individual votes were legible through the sleeve*" (emphasis added).

Salt Lake County is the one county in the state that provides the security sleeve referenced in the Auditor's findings. I wish to provide the following information in order to avoid any confusion or misunderstanding about the secrecy of ballots in this county.

First, the security sleeve and ballot are removed from the return envelope by an OPEX extractor machine. The ballots are stacked together and the return envelopes are immediately dropped into a container beneath the machine. During this process, it is impossible for the OPEX operator to view ballot choices through the sleeve and associate those with a voter's return envelope.

Second, once they are separated from the return envelope, there is nothing on the sleeve or the ballot that identifies the voter. Therefore, the statement that "individual votes were legible through the sleeve" is irrelevant. Even if votes were somehow legible through the secrecy sleeve, there is nothing at that point to identify the voter who submitted the ballot.

I respectfully request that this additional information be considered and encourage the State Auditor to adjust his written findings accordingly on this particular issue. I welcome an opportunity to demonstrate this portion of our process as I think it might not have been clearly recognized in the tour given to the Auditor's representatives.

As you know, with our vote-by-mail process, it is crucial that voters are confident that our process protects the secrecy of their ballots and meets constitutional requirements. Thank you and if you have any questions, please let me know.



Salt Lake County Clerk



[REDACTED]

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**From:** Sherrie Swensen  
**Sent:** Tuesday, September 17, 2019 6:01 PM  
**To:** Hatch, Ricky  
**Cc:** Lannie Chapman; Pam Tueller; Stephen Moore; Justin Lee; Derek Brenchley <dbrenchley@utah.gov> (dbrenchley@utah.gov)  
**Subject:** FW: Need talking points re: private voter records

Hi Ricky,

I know you will remember how deficient our laws used to be in allowing voters to protect their information. I recall that in the fall of 2013 I was contacted by a very upset voter who found all of Utah's voter information on the Internet. [REDACTED] had come to Utah from New Hampshire, purchased the list from the Lt. Governor's Office (the release of which was required by law), and posted it on his website ([www.utvoters.com](http://www.utvoters.com)) where he also sold banner ads. At that time, the law didn't allow a voter to request their information to be made private under any circumstance. We weren't required to print on voter registration forms that the records were public, so individuals registering to vote were often unaware that their information was being distributed to anyone who requested it.


After that news story aired, a woman came to the Election Office in tears and said she was moving that weekend because she was terrified her abusive ex-husband knew where she lived. She had no idea that her information was being distributed. That is just one of many examples of how outraged voters were when they found out their information, including their birthdates, was being widely distributed.

As a result, I contacted Senator Karen Mayne and asked for her help to change the law. Dahnelle Burton-Lee and I originally proposed language so voter information would only be available for the purpose for which it was intended - to register to vote, for political parties and campaigns, etc. The law would have been much like California's, which reads: *The voter registration rolls are not available to the general public. However, California law allows certain voter information to be released to a member of the California Legislature or U.S. Congress, to any candidate, to any committee for or against a proposed ballot measure, and to any person for election, scholarly, journalistic, or political purpose, or for governmental purposes. Even in these cases, a few items remain confidential and are never provided to any requestor: your social security number, your driver license number, and your signature.* We also tried to include that the information wouldn't be published on the Internet like California's law.  
([http://leginfo.ca.gov/faces/codes\\_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=ELEC&sectionNum=2194](http://leginfo.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=ELEC&sectionNum=2194).)

However, Senator Mayne got barraged with opposition, including from the Media Coalition lobbyists. (That was surprising because we had made sure journalists could acquire information. We felt that was important.) When I arrived at that first Senate Committee Meeting, the hallway was full of lobbyists from financial and insurance institutions, private investigators, Lexis Nexis, etc., and they wanted all the information to be public as it always had been. I prepared packets for every legislator who served on Senate and House Govt. Ops Committees which contained copies of the information for each of their family members that was posted on [REDACTED]'s website. The final version of SB 36 didn't look anything like our original proposal, but at least it included some small protections about who could obtain our voter information. It required a notice be added to registration forms that the information is public and provided a way for voters to request their record be made private if they were being harassed, or if their life was in danger.

Senator Karen Mayne contacted me again and asked if we could do more to better protect voter information. She was hearing from concerned constituents about their voter information being made so public. I suggested the law should be changed to make the day of birth private information. In 2018, she sponsored SB 74 and it passed. It also allowed for voters to opt to protect their information by checking a box on their registration form.





From: Hatch, Ricky <[rhatch@co.weber.ut.us](mailto:rhatch@co.weber.ut.us)>  
Sent: Tuesday, September 17, 2019 9:06 AM  
To: Cowley, Ryan <[rcowley@co.weber.ut.us](mailto:rcowley@co.weber.ut.us)>; [bmckenzie@daviscountvutah.gov](mailto:bmckenzie@daviscountvutah.gov); [sswensen@slco.org](mailto:sswensen@slco.org); Kent Jones ([kentjones@summitcounty.org](mailto:kentjones@summitcounty.org)) <[kentjones@summitcounty.org](mailto:kentjones@summitcounty.org)>; Karla Johnson ([clerkkj@kane.utah.gov](mailto:clerkkj@kane.utah.gov)) <[clerkkj@kane.utah.gov](mailto:clerkkj@kane.utah.gov)>; [mrowley@co.millard.ut.us](mailto:mrowley@co.millard.ut.us); JoAnn Evans ([jevans@duchesne.utah.gov](mailto:jevans@duchesne.utah.gov)) <[jevans@duchesne.utah.gov](mailto:jevans@duchesne.utah.gov)>; [jwhittaker@ironcounty.net](mailto:jwhittaker@ironcounty.net); Wade, Daniel <[DWade@co.weber.ut.us](mailto:DWade@co.weber.ut.us)>; Fitzpatrick, Megan <[mfitzpatrick1@co.weber.ut.us](mailto:mfitzpatrick1@co.weber.ut.us)>; Lincoln Shurtz ([lincoln@uacnet.org](mailto:lincoln@uacnet.org)) <[lincoln@uacnet.org](mailto:lincoln@uacnet.org)>; [bryan@uacnet.org](mailto:bryan@uacnet.org); Curtis Koch ([ckoch@co.davis.ut.us](mailto:ckoch@co.davis.ut.us)) <[ckoch@co.davis.ut.us](mailto:ckoch@co.davis.ut.us)>; [ptueller@slco.org](mailto:ptueller@slco.org); Marla Young ([myoung@boxeldercounty.org](mailto:myoung@boxeldercounty.org)) <[myoung@boxeldercounty.org](mailto:myoung@boxeldercounty.org)>; 'Jill Zollinger' ([jill.zollinger@cachecountv.org](mailto:jill.zollinger@cachecountv.org)) <[jill.zollinger@cachecountv.org](mailto:jill.zollinger@cachecountv.org)>; Marilyn Gillette <[mgillette@tooeleco.org](mailto:mgillette@tooeleco.org)>  
Cc: [justinlee@utah.gov](mailto:justinlee@utah.gov); Derek Branchley ([dbrenchley@utah.gov](mailto:dbrenchley@utah.gov)) <[dbrenchley@utah.gov](mailto:dbrenchley@utah.gov)>  
Subject: Need talking points re: private voter records

Hi everyone,

The legislature is considering [REDACTED]

They'll discuss the matter tomorrow morning at the Gov Ops Interim Committee Hearing. Senator Anderegg seems to be a key voice in the matter. Fortunately, he seems to understand the importance of having the ability to request that a record be made private.

Here's an article that gives a feel for what their concerns are and how they'd like to change the law: <https://www.sltrib.com/news/politics/2019/09/16/utah-voters-uses-new/>

I'd like to be able to offer them at least a couple of alternatives. Here are a couple of possibilities:

[REDACTED]

Please share your ideas on possible ways we can help the parties without compromising the protections that comes from private records.

Thanks,  
R.

Ricky Hatch, CPA, CPO  
Clerk/Auditor  
Weber County



**From:** Sherrie Swensen  
**To:** Justin Lee - State Election Division ([justinlee@utah.gov](mailto:justinlee@utah.gov)); Hatch,Ricky; [ckoch@co.davis.ut.us](mailto:ckoch@co.davis.ut.us); Brian McKenzie; [rcowley@co.weber.ut.us](mailto:rcowley@co.weber.ut.us); Lannie Chapman  
**Subject:** RE: [EXTERNAL]Mobile Voting Bill  
**Date:** Tuesday, January 19, 2021 5:13:11 PM  
**Attachments:** [image002.png](#)  
[image004.png](#)  
[image006.jpg](#)

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We looked at both Democracy Live and VOATZ for UOCAVA Voters. In the November General Election, only 1,897 voters used emailed ballots and 467 UOCAVA voters used the by-mail option.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Thank you,



**Sherrie Swensen**

Salt Lake County Clerk

[sswensen@slco.org](mailto:sswensen@slco.org)

385-468-7370



[SLCO Clerk Website](#)

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**From:** Hatch,Ricky <[rhatch@co.weber.ut.us](mailto:rhatch@co.weber.ut.us)>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, January 19, 2021 4:31 PM  
**To:** Justin Lee <[justinlee@utah.gov](mailto:justinlee@utah.gov)>; Sherrie Swensen <[sswensen@slco.org](mailto:sswensen@slco.org)>; Curtis Koch <[ckoch@co.davis.ut.us](mailto:ckoch@co.davis.ut.us)>  
**Cc:** Cowley,Ryan <[rcowley@co.weber.ut.us](mailto:rcowley@co.weber.ut.us)>; Brian McKenzie <[bmckenzie@co.davis.ut.us](mailto:bmckenzie@co.davis.ut.us)>; Lannie Chapman <[LKChapman@slco.org](mailto:LKChapman@slco.org)>  
**Subject:** RE: [EXTERNAL]Mobile Voting Bill

Thanks for checking.

Not a fan of requiring [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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**From:** Sherrie Swensen  
**Sent:** Monday, September 14, 2020 2:02 PM  
**To:** Sonja Hutson  
**Cc:** Justin Lee - State Election Division (justinlee@utah.gov); Derek Brenchley <dbrenchley@utah.gov> (dbrenchley@utah.gov)  
**Subject:** RE: KUER Question: Polling Locations  
**Attachments:** Copy of 2016G Machine deployment (2).xlsx

Here is the list of Vote Centers we actually used in the 2016 General Election. We had planned on 41, but 4 of them canceled.

The number of registered voters on the 2016 Election Night Results is below:  
Registered Voters 510,397 - Cards Cast 427,064

Here is the number of active registered voters as of right now in VISTA –

Total	571,007
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**Sherrie Swensen**

Salt Lake County Clerk

[sswensen@slco.org](mailto:sswensen@slco.org)

385-468-7370



[SLCO Clerk Website](#)

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**From:** Sonja Hutson [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Monday, September 14, 2020 11:55 AM  
**To:** Sherrie Swensen <SSwensen@slco.org>  
**Subject:** KUER Question: Polling Locations

Hi Sherrie,

It's Sonja Hutson at KUER. Hope you had a good weekend!

Earlier this month you mentioned to me on the phone that Salt Lake County would have around 60 polling locations, and that that was much more than usual. But, according to data I got from the state, Salt Lake County had 575 polling locations in 2016, 140 of which were in Salt Lake City. I've attached the spreadsheet that Justin Lee gave me to this email, with two pivot tables I made that break down the number of polling locations per city and per county. (Salt Lake County is County #18).

So, it appears there will actually be significantly fewer polling places this fall. Could you clarify? If that's true, could you explain why?

Happy to chat on the phone about this if you have a few minutes today.

Many thanks,  
Sonja



### 2016 Vote Centers - General

	Location	Address	City	Zip
1	Bingham Canyon Lions Club	320 E Hillcrest St (10382 S 8650 W)	Copperton	84006
2	Bingham Creek Library	4834 W 9000 S	West Jordan	84091
3	Cottonwood Heights City Hall	2277 E Bengal Blvd (7600 S)	Cottonwood Heights	84121
4	Draper City Hall	1020 E Pioneer Rd (12450 S)	Draper	84020
5	First Congregational Church	2150 S Foothill Dr (2755 E)	Salt Lake City	84109
6	Holladay City Hall	4580 S 2300 E	Holladay	84117
7	Hunter Library	4740 W 4100 S	West Valley	84120
8	Kearns Library	5350 S 4220 W	Kearns	84129
9	Kenwood LDS Church (Millcreek)	1765 E 3080 S	Millcreek	84106
10	Magna Senior Center	9228 W Magna Main St (2700 S)	Magna	84044
11	Marmalade Library	280 W 500 N	Salt Lake City	84103
12	Midvale City Hall	7505 Holden St (720 W)	Midvale	84047
13	Millcreek Senior Center	2266 E Evergreen Ave (3435 S)	Millcreek	84109
14	Murray City Hall	5025 S State St (100 E)	Murray	84107
15	River's Bend Northwest Senior Center	1300 W 300 N	Salt Lake City	84116
16	Riverton Senior Center	12914 S Redwood Rd (1700 W)	Riverton	84065
17	Sandy City Fire Station 33	2015 E 11270 S	Sandy	84092
18	Sandy City Hall	10000 S Centennial Parkway (170 W)	Sandy	84070
19	Sandy Senior Center	9310 S 1300 E	Sandy	84094
20	Sorenson Multicultural Center	855 W California Ave (1300 S)	Salt Lake City	84104
21	South Jordan City Fire Station	4022 S Jordan Pkwy (10400 S)	South Jordan	84009
22	South Jordan Founders Park	11685 S Kestrel Rise Rd (4500 W)	South Jordan	84009
23	South Jordan Library	10673 S Redwood Rd (1700 W)	South Jordan	84095
24	South Mountain Community Center	14216 S Bangerter Pkwy (200 E)	Draper	84020
25	South Salt Lake City Hall	220 E Morris Ave (2430 S)	South Salt Lake	84115
26	Taylorsville City Hall	2600 W Taylorsville Blvd (5325 S)	Taylorsville	84129
27	Trolley Square (Room D117)	600 S 700 E	Salt Lake City	84102
28	U of U Marriott Library	295 S 1500 E	Salt Lake City	84112
29	UFA Fire Station Emigration Canyon	5025 E Emigration Canyon Rd (840 S)	Salt Lake City	84108
30	UFA Fire Station Midvale 12	607 E Fort Union Blvd (7200 S)	Midvale	84047
31	UFA Fire Station Riverton 1	4146 W 12600 S	Riverton	84096
32	UFA Fire Station Rosecrest	4850 W Patriot Ridge Dr (14620 S)	Herriman	84096
33	UFA Fire Station Suncrest 1	14903 S Deer Ridge Dr (2070 E)	Draper	84020
34	West Jordan Library (Viridia)	8030 S 1825 W	West Jordan	84088
35	West Valley City Hall	3600 S Constitution Blvd (2700 W)	West Valley	84119
36	Wheeler Historic Farm	6351 S 900 E	Murray	84121
37	Salt Lake County Government	2001 S State St (100 E)	Salt Lake City	84190

**From:** Mark Mitchell <markm@utah.gov>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, October 30, 2019 6:55 AM  
**To:** Pam Tueller  
**Cc:** Justin Lee; Sherrie Swensen; Lannie Chapman  
**Subject:** Re: KSL Inquiry--Deceased Voter Ballots

Checking on it.

**Mark B. Mitchell**

Director of Elections Systems  
Office of the Lieutenant Governor  
State of Utah

[markm@utah.gov](mailto:markm@utah.gov)  
(801) 538-9581

On Wed, Oct 30, 2019 at 6:32 AM Pam Tueller <[PTueller@slco.org](mailto:PTueller@slco.org)> wrote:

Good morning,

It looks like we have received the death records from January 29<sup>th</sup> and 30<sup>th</sup>, but we do not have any from the 31<sup>st</sup> is that correct?

Thank you,



**Pam Tueller**

Election Director

Salt Lake County Clerk

[ptueller@slco.org](mailto:ptueller@slco.org)

385-468-7425



[SLCO Clerk Website](#)



State of Utah

markm@utah.gov  
(801) 538-9581

----- Forwarded message -----

From: **Kevin Higgs** <khiggs@utah.gov>  
Date: Tue, Oct 29, 2019 at 1:52 PM  
Subject: Fwd: KSL Inquiry--Deceased Voter Ballots  
To: Mitchell, Mark <markm@utah.gov>

----- Forwarded message -----

From: **Tom Hudachko** <thudachko@utah.gov>  
Date: Tue, Oct 29, 2019 at 1:50 PM  
Subject: Re: KSL Inquiry--Deceased Voter Ballots  
To: Kevin Higgs <khiggs@utah.gov>

Hi Kevin - See below for the message I received from OVRs explaining what happened. A screenshot of the email is attached as well. Thanks

Human error. I think when I sent the 2019Jan15toJan28 data,

I was thinking February and there are generally only 28 days in February.

Data was inadvertently not sent for 2019Jan29toJan31.

deceased  
dod 01/29/2019  
reg 01/31/2019

Files sent:

deceased voters 2019Jan15toJan28 20190207

deceased voters 2019Feb01toFeb14 20190220 (449)

Hi Cindy,

We can do an interview with you on this topic next week.

Thank you,



**Sherrie Swensen**

Salt Lake County Clerk

[sswensen@slco.org](mailto:sswensen@slco.org)

385-468-7370



[Website](#)

[SLCO Clerk](#)

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**From:** Cindy St. Clair [REDACTED] >  
**Sent:** Tuesday, October 22, 2019 2:07 PM  
**To:** Sherrie Swensen <[sswensen@slco.org](mailto:sswensen@slco.org)>  
**Cc:** Brittany Glas [REDACTED] >  
**Subject:** RE: KSL Inquiry--Deceased Voter Ballots

Hi Sherrie,

Just circling back on this request. Do you have some time for us this week or next to do an on-camera interview regarding deceased voters?






From: Sherrie Swensen <SSwensen@slco.org>  
Sent: Friday, October 18, 2019 5:29 PM  
To: Cindy St. Clair [REDACTED] >  
Subject: RE: KSL Inquiry--Deceased Voter Ballots

Hi Cindy,

For every ballot returned by mail, we compare the signature on the ballot envelope affidavit to the signature on the voter's registration record. The signature is the version of identification that is required for a voter returning a ballot by mail. This is a copy of the signature box that is on the ballot return envelope.

Voter must sign the box below in order for ballot to be counted	
<div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 40px; width: 100%;"></div>	<b>Vote-by-Mail Affidavit and Signature of Voter</b>
	<div style="text-align: center;"> <b>SIGN HERE</b></div>
Email (optional): _____	County of Salt Lake
Phone Number (optional): _____	State of Utah
<small>I solemnly swear that: I am a qualified resident voter and that I am entitled to vote in this election. I am not a convicted felon currently incarcerated for commission of a felony.</small>	
<small>(NOTE: Your email and phone number will only be used by the Election Division if we need to contact you.)</small>	

The State Vital Records does a match of deceased voters in the statewide database every two weeks. If a voter is identified in that list as deceased, it puts that record into a "suspense" status.

We also check the obituaries on an ongoing basis and put voters identified in the obituaries as suspended in the database.

Often times the surviving family members notify us of a deceased family member.

We sent the ballot order to the printer on September 27<sup>th</sup>. [REDACTED] could have been deceased after the ballot order was placed. I could not find his name in the obituaries. However, the signature

- How do you try and counteract this?
- How do you get your data about deaths in the county?
- What's the processing time for taking them off the rolls?
- Does the surviving spouse need to cancel the decedent's voter registration?
- Do you audit voter records to make sure deceased people are not voting?
- How often do you come across ballots that have been completed by allegedly deceased persons?

Could we grab an on-camera interview with you late next week on this topic for a news story? Please let me know what you need from my end.

Thanks!

**Cindy St. Clair**

-Producer, KSL Investigators-



[www.ksl.com](http://www.ksl.com)



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Tom Hudachko | Director of Communications

Utah Department of Health



**From:** Sherrie Swensen  
**Sent:** Friday, October 30, 2020 12:24 PM  
**To:** Justin Lee - State Election Division (justinlee@utah.gov)  
**Cc:** Lannie Chapman  
**Subject:** RE: Important: Disqualified Governor Candidate

Will this be ok for displaying our Election Results on the Duerden/Hill contest?  
Thank you,



**Sherrie Swensen**  
Salt Lake County Clerk  
[sswensen@slco.org](mailto:sswensen@slco.org)  
385-468-7370



[SLCO Clerk Website](#)

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**From:** Mark Pemberton <MPemberton@slco.org>  
**Sent:** Friday, October 30, 2020 10:29 AM  
**To:** Sherrie Swensen <SSwensen@slco.org>  
**Cc:** Lannie Chapman <LKChapman@slco.org>  
**Subject:** RE: Important: Disqualified Governor Candidate

Will this work?

★	GOVERNOR
DEM	CHRIS PETERSON / KARINA BROWN
IAP	GREG DUERDEN (disqualified) / WAYNE HILL
REP	SPENCER J. COX / DEIDRE M. HENDERSON
LIB	DANIEL RHEAD COTTAM / BARRY EVAN SHORT
	WRITE-IN

Mark Pemberton  
385-468-7411

801-538-1746

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You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "[vsug@utah.gov](mailto:vsug@utah.gov)" group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [vsug+unsubscribe@utah.gov](mailto:vsug+unsubscribe@utah.gov).

To view this discussion on the web visit

[https://groups.google.com/a/utah.gov/d/msgid/vsug/CAPm87YH8r1jr2rTn3ukp%3DNSJFaBNH0kHpUtLnuJ5\\_es5xvHVdg%40mail.gmail.com](https://groups.google.com/a/utah.gov/d/msgid/vsug/CAPm87YH8r1jr2rTn3ukp%3DNSJFaBNH0kHpUtLnuJ5_es5xvHVdg%40mail.gmail.com).

**From:** Justin Lee <justinlee@utah.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 16, 2021 12:31 PM  
**To:** VSUsersGroup Voting-Systems-Users-Group  
**Subject:** Re: Intelligence Report on Foreign Threats in 2020  
**Attachments:** 21\_0311\_key-findings-and-recommendations-related-to-2020-elections\_0.pdf

Attached is another product from DHS, DOJ.

-----  
Justin Lee  
Director of Elections  
Office of the Lieutenant Governor  
State of Utah  
[justinlee@utah.gov](mailto:justinlee@utah.gov)

On Tue, Mar 16, 2021 at 12:23 PM Justin Lee <[justinlee@utah.gov](mailto:justinlee@utah.gov)> wrote:  
Good Afternoon,

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence has released a report on Foreign Threats to the 2020 Election. If you would like to read the declassified brief you can find it here: <https://www.odni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications/reports-publications-2021/item/2192-intelligence-community-assessment-on-foreign-threats-to-the-2020-u-s-federal-elections>.

Thanks for all you do to keep our elections secure.

Justin

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Justin Lee  
Director of Elections  
Office of the Lieutenant Governor  
State of Utah  
[justinlee@utah.gov](mailto:justinlee@utah.gov)

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You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "vsug@utah.gov" group.  
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [vsug+unsubscribe@utah.gov](mailto:vsug+unsubscribe@utah.gov).  
To view this discussion on the web visit  
[https://groups.google.com/a/utah.gov/d/msgid/vsug/CAM\\_AU5z6rdzfFrnx6hZGtLT%3DT9Jrq%2BpKb%3DJpTZfZ\\_6q2ufu\\_d2A%40mail.gmail.com](https://groups.google.com/a/utah.gov/d/msgid/vsug/CAM_AU5z6rdzfFrnx6hZGtLT%3DT9Jrq%2BpKb%3DJpTZfZ_6q2ufu_d2A%40mail.gmail.com).



## Background

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This product provides a declassified overview of findings and recommendations from a classified joint report from the Attorney General and Secretary of Homeland Security addressing the impact of activities by foreign governments and their agents targeting election infrastructure or infrastructure pertaining to political organizations, candidates, or campaigns used in the 2020 US federal elections on the security or integrity of such infrastructure. Pursuant to Executive Order (EO) 13848, the joint report relied on the Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) addressing foreign threats to the 2020 US elections.

## Scope Note

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In February 2021, the Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Department of Homeland Security, including the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), prepared a classified joint report to fulfill the requirement under EO 13848 § (1)(b) that the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security deliver a joint report to the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Defense evaluating, with respect to the 2020 federal elections:

- (i) the extent to which any foreign interference that targeted election infrastructure materially affected the security or integrity of that infrastructure, the tabulation of votes, or the timely transmission of election results; and
- (ii) if any foreign interference involved activities targeting the infrastructure of, or pertaining to, a political organization, campaign, or candidate, the extent to which such activities materially affected the security or integrity of that infrastructure, including by unauthorized access to, disclosure or threatened disclosure of, or alteration or falsification of, information or data.

The purpose of this report was solely to evaluate the impact of foreign government activity on the security or integrity of the covered infrastructure. It did not address the effect of foreign government activity on public perception or the behavior of any voters, nor did it address the impact of non-state foreign actors like cybercriminals.

## Sources of Information

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Foreign government activities were included regardless of whether the IC has assessed that they were undertaken with the purpose of interfering in a 2020 federal election. Foreign governments may target election or political and campaign infrastructure for a variety of reasons, including intelligence collection, and the purpose of any activity may not always be apparent. The impact to covered infrastructure was evaluated by considering, among other information, FBI forensic analyses; CISA cyber incident response activities, risk analysis, and stakeholder information; IC reporting; and open-source reporting.



## Recommendations

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Improvements in cyber and physical security, supply chain risk management, partnerships, and public messaging enhanced the resilience of the electoral process to the vulnerabilities actors sought to exploit during the 2020 federal elections. We recommend the US Government continue and expand its support of these efforts.

- **Physical Security and Cyber Hygiene.** Since 2018, election officials, political organizations, and campaigns implemented significant defensive measures to enhance the security of their infrastructure and limit the disruptive potential of an intrusion. Implementing defensive measures such as firewalls, up-to-date patching, and multifactor authentication, pre-election testing of voting equipment, federal and state certification of such equipment, cybersecurity training for government personnel, and separation of election-specific systems from other computer networks all helped to protect the integrity of infrastructure. Implementing redundancy measures like paper pollbooks backups, auditable ballots, and post-election audits ensures election officials could limit the impact of a cyber incident with minimal disruption to voting, conduct credible recounts, and stay alert to potential manipulation or errors. We recommend that the US Government continue to help election officials, political organizations, and campaigns adopt best practices for infrastructure and election security.
- **Third-Party Vendor Security and Supply Chain Risk Management.** Recent supply chain compromises highlight the dependencies and vulnerabilities shared across vendor and client networks. State, local, and private sector election partners continue to lean on the federal government to share best practices for supply chain risk management. Since 2018, election officials and vendors have begun to incorporate software bill of goods and breach notification requirements into acquisition and contract management activities. We recommend that the US Government continue assisting election officials, political organizations, and campaigns with establishing and refining supply chain risk management procedures.
- **Engagement and Collaboration.** Since 2018, federal, state, local, and private sector partners nationwide worked together in unprecedented ways to combat foreign interference efforts, to support state and local officials in safeguarding election infrastructure, and to assist political organizations, campaigns, and candidates in protecting their own infrastructure. The US Government sought to foster an environment in which state and local officials, political organizations, campaigns, and candidates could share information on malicious or suspicious cyber activities, ultimately receiving and sharing information efficiently with all 50 US states and nearly 3,000 local jurisdictions. We recommend continued US Government focus on actively engaging with and fostering collaboration and coordination with federal, state, local, and private sector partners.
- **Public Messaging and Education.** Since 2018, the US Government significantly increased public messaging and education to provide accurate and timely information about cyber threats pertaining to elections. This included public attribution to help educate the public about adversary goals, defensive steps to improve cybersecurity, warning of potential threat activities to mitigate their effects, and fact checks to control the proliferation of misinformation. However, the resonance of baseless claims concerning foreign interference after the election demonstrates the need to bolster public confidence in reliable sources of information, such as state and local election officials. We recommend the US Government continue to increase the quantity and quality of public messaging and education.



**From:** Justin Lee on behalf of Justin Lee <[justinlee@utah.gov](mailto:justinlee@utah.gov)>  
**To:** Sherrie Swensen; Rozan Mitchell; Adam Miller  
**Subject:** Fwd: Granite School District Postcard  
**Date:** Tuesday, October 24, 2017 10:36:33 AM  
**Attachments:** [IMG\\_7746.jpg](#)  
[IMG\\_7747.jpg](#)

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Good morning,


One more that we received, that you might hear about.

Thanks,

-----  
Justin Lee  
Deputy Director of Elections  
Office of the Lieutenant Governor  
State of Utah  
801.538.1129  
[justinlee@utah.gov](mailto:justinlee@utah.gov)

# SAFETY & SECURITY

2017 SCHOOL BOND



*Register to vote: [vote.ut.gov](http://vote.ut.gov)*

In addition to rebuilds and remodels, the 2017 school bond will allow revitalizing upgrades for schools, including seismic improvements and security updates.



A large portion of our schools buildings are at risk of becoming completely unusable if a major seismic event were to strike the Wasatch Front.



Most of our schools are in need of security updates to ensure student safety. These are modern concerns that were not considered in school designs 30-50 years ago.



**From:** Sherrie Swensen  
**To:** [Justin Lee](#)  
**Cc:** [Derek Brenchley <dbrenchley@utah.gov>](#); [\(dbrenchley@utah.gov\)](#); [Pam Tueller](#); [Lannie Chapman](#)  
**Subject:** 2020 Presidential Primary Election Certified Results  
**Date:** Tuesday, March 17, 2020 5:49:33 PM  
**Attachments:** [2020 Presidential Primary Election Official Final Results.pdf](#)  
[Board of Canvassers Signature Sheet for 2020 Pres Primary \(March 17, 2020\).pdf](#)  
[2020 Audit for Pres. Primary.pdf](#)  
[image007.png](#)  
[image008.png](#)  
[image009.jpg](#)

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Attached are the final results for the 2020 Presidential Primary Election. Also included is the Audit Summary Report.

I will send you an updated Board of Canvassers Signature Sheet when we get the signatures of the two members who were in attendance by telephone - Aimee Winder Newton and Arlyn Bradshaw.  
I will send results for each congressional district to Jeff Merchant.

Thank you,



**Sherrie Swensen**

Salt Lake County Clerk

[sswensen@slco.org](mailto:sswensen@slco.org)

385-468-7370



[SLCO Clerk Website](#)



**Sherrie Swensen**  
Salt Lake County Clerk

**Lannie Chapman**  
Chief Deputy Clerk



March 17, 2020

BOARD OF CANVASSERS, SALT LAKE COUNTY  
2001 SOUTH STATE STREET  
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84190

HONORABLE BOARD MEMBERS:

The OFFICIAL CANVASS OF VOTES for the MARCH 3, 2020 PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY Election, convened in the Council Chambers of the Salt Lake County Government Center, on MARCH 17, 2020. The results were presented to the Board for certification.

The Board of Canvassers consisting of the following members hereby accept the official results:

\_\_\_\_\_  
ARLYN BRADSHAW

\_\_\_\_\_  
MICHAEL JENSEN

\_\_\_\_\_  
AIMEE WINDER NEWTON

\_\_\_\_\_  
ANN GRANATO

\_\_\_\_\_  
STEVE DERRY

\_\_\_\_\_  
MAX BURDICK

\_\_\_\_\_  
SHIREEN GHORBANI

\_\_\_\_\_  
RICHARD SNELGROVE

\_\_\_\_\_  
JIM BRADLEY

I, SHERRIE SWENSEN, COUNTY CLERK IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE ATTACHED REPORT IS A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THE FINAL TABULATION OF VOTES FOR THE ELECTION HELD IN SALT LAKE COUNTY ON TUESDAY, MARCH 3, 2020.

\_\_\_\_\_  
SHERRIE SWENSEN  
Salt Lake County Clerk



**From:** Justin Lee on behalf of Justin Lee <[justinlee@utah.gov](mailto:justinlee@utah.gov)>  
**To:** Ricky Hatch; Curtis Koch; Sherrie Swensen; Amelia Powers; Derek Brenchley  
**Subject:** Fwd: Election Amendments  
**Date:** Saturday, April 11, 2020 12:28:01 PM  
**Attachments:** [2020S30007\\_003.pdf](#)  
[image002.jpg](#)

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Attached is the protected draft of the special session election amendment bill dealing with the June Primary. You can share this with your staff, or other county clerks, but it should not be shared outside of your office. They need feedback by 9:00 a.m. on Monday.

You do not need to send feedback to me, it can be sent directly to Tom Vaughn, but I think it would be wise to aggregate feedback from the counties into one place.

Best,  
Justin

-----  
Justin Lee  
Director of Elections  
Office of the Lieutenant Governor  
State of Utah  
801.538.1129  
[justinlee@utah.gov](mailto:justinlee@utah.gov)

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** Tom Vaughn <[TomVaughn@le.utah.gov](mailto:TomVaughn@le.utah.gov)>  
**Date:** Sat, Apr 11, 2020 at 12:15 PM  
**Subject:** Election Amendments  
**To:** Justin Lee <[justinlee@utah.gov](mailto:justinlee@utah.gov)>

Justin:

Please send the attached version to the county clerks for review and make sure they know not to make this public yet. This is still a protected record under GRAMA. Please get back to me with any comments before 9 a.m. Monday morning. I am still having the cross-references checked. So far, we have found the following errors, which we will correct in a future draft:

- [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]



## ELECTION AMENDMENTS

2020 THIRD SPECIAL SESSION

STATE OF UTAH

**LONG TITLE**

[illegible]

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[illegible]



[illegible]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]